At first sight, the argument which F. P. Ramsey gave for (the infinite case of) his famous theorem from 1927, is hopelessly unconstructive. If suitably reformulated, the theorem is true intuitionistically as well as classically: we offer a proof which should convince both the classical and the intuitionistic reader.
(Note that we write 'i?(m,«)' for \m,n)eR\)
What is the constructive content of this theorem? This question may be treated in different ways. Some kind of an answer has been given by Specker [13] and also by C. G. Jockusch [6] . They exhibited recursive binary relations RonN, such that there is no recursive infinite i?-homogeneous subset of N, and thereby showed Ramsey's Theorem to be false in that particular branch of constructive mathematics which one calls recursive mathematics (cf. [2 or 14] , for a survey of possible positions within constructive mathematics). One may be surprised that classical logic is not generally avoided in recursion theory. It does not seem proper to use nonconstructive arguments when treating algorithmic objects.
We study Ramsey's Theorem from an intuitionistic point of view, and accordingly take serious the 'either ... or...' which occurs in its above formulation. The theorem does not stand this reading. The following one-dimensional case and easy consequence of the theorem, which sometimes goes by the name of pigeonhole principle, already fails to be true.
For every subset R of M there exists an infinite subset A of N such that either Vm € A[m E R] or Vm e A[m $ R].
We refute this principle by a Brouwerian counterexample.
Let p: N -> {0,1,..., 9} be the decimal development of the real number n. Consider R := {ne N 131 ^ riii < 99[p{l+ i) = 9]}. Whoever claims that this set R is (intuition-istically) infinite, implies, probably recklessly, that there exists an unbroken sequence of 99 nines in the decimal development of n; whoever claims that N\/? is infinite, implies, probably recklessly, that there is no such sequence.
Observe that the set R constructed in this example is recursive, and that from a classical point of view, either R itself or its complement is recursive and infinite. There do exist classical recursion-theoretic counterexamples to the pigeonhole principle, that is, subsets R of N such that neither R nor its complement contains an infinite recursive subset. Such sets must be nonrecursive and are called bi-immune subsets of N. It is interesting to note that Jockusch first studied bi-immune subsets of N and then found his recursive counterexample to Ramsey's Theorem.
We shall see in Section 3 of this paper, that the pigeonhole principle plays a key role in some classical proofs of Ramsey's Theorem. We shall see in Section 8 of this paper that the construction of a recursive counterexample to Ramsey's Theorem is related to the construction of a bi-immune subset of N.
1.2 Whenever a theorem from classical mathematics proves to be false intuitionistically, one may try, pondering the classical arguments and, while preserving its classical meaning, reformulating the theorem in many different ways, to find intuitionistically valid versions of it. We did so for Ramsey's Theorem. The Intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem that we present in Section 6 of this paper is a negationless statement of intuitionistic analysis, classically equivalent to Ramsey's Theorem itself. In the proof of this theorem we obey the laws of intuitionistic logic, but we use no more than one intuitionistic axiom, namely, the principle of induction on monotone bars. As the principle is not, like the famous continuity principles, contrary to classical assumptions, but admits of a not too difficult classical justification, the proof is acceptable classically as well as intuitionistically. Before proving the Intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem, we first establish, in Section 5 of this paper, a similar Intuitionistic Pigeonhole Principle.
1.3 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recapitulate the principles of intuitionistic analysis, and we give some notation. In Section 3 we formulate a classical proof of Ramsey's Theorem. In Section 4 we develop an intuitionistic argument from this classical proof. In Section 5 we study the (infinite) pigeonhole principle. In Section 6 we treat the Intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem. In Section 7 we generalize our theorem from binary to ternary, and further to «-ary relations on 1^. In Section 8 we discuss the recursion-theoretic counterexamples mentioned in 1.1 from an intuitionistic point of view. In Section 9 we show how a recent result of Coquand's easily follows from our main theorem. Section 10 contains some concluding remarks.
Intuitionistic analysis
2.1 Our discussion concerns the set N of natural numbers and the set Jf of functions from N to N. We use m,n,p,q,... as variables over the set N and a,/?,... as variables over the set Jf. We use intuitionistic logic, as we interpret connectives and quantifiers constructively. This means, in particular, that a proof of a disjunction A\i B should contain either a proof of A or a proof of B (and we are able to decide which one), and that a proof of an existential statement 3JC[^(A:)] should contain an effective method to find an object x with the property A(x). We accept this axiom, as, in our view, an element a of JV may be constructed stepby-step, first a(0), then a(l), and so on. We feel no obligation to describe a in finitely many words. Observe that C need not be a decidable relation on N, therefore it is not possible, in general, to define a by: for all mGN:<x(m) is the least neN such that C(m, n). We shall not use in our main argument the stronger intuitionistic axiom of countable choice AC 0 15 nor any continuity principle.
fol* = |J n 6^N
n is the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers. A finite sequence a = <a(0),a(l), ...,a(n-1)> may be thought of as a function from the set {0,1,...,« -1} to N. <> is the empty sequence, the only sequence of length 0. *:M*xN*->l\l* is the concatenation function, that is, for all a,beN*, a*b denotes the finite sequence which results from putting b behind a.
2.4
We introduce the principle of induction on monotone bars.
(Q is inductive). Then:<2«».
(We write l P(a)' for ' a e P ' and similarly in similar cases.) This principle, which seems to be implicit in Brouwer's argument for his bar theorem, was made an axiom of intuitionistic analysis by Kleene. On this muchdiscussed axiom, the reader may consult [8 or 14] .
S
} is the set of all finite strictly increasing sequences of natural numbers.
y := {a e Jf \ V«[a(«) < <x(n + 1)]} is the set of all strictly increasing functions from N to N.
In elementary intuitionistic analysis, the following principle is an easy consequence of BI M itself.
BI^,: Let P, Q be subsets of S such that
Then:<2«».
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A classical proof of Ramsey's Theorem
Let R be a binary relation on N. We sketch a classical argument by which one obtains an infinite /^-homogeneous subset of N.
3.1 One defines, for each finite sequence a = <<z(0), «(1), ...,a(n-1)> of natural numbers: a is R-homeogeneous if and only if a is strictly increasing and for all m,p,q <n such that m< p and m < q.R{a{m),a{p))*-+R(a(m),a(q)). Observe that every strictly increasing finite sequence of length ^ 2 is /?-homeogeneous.
3.2 One uses the following fact. For all aeN*, and i,j,keN such that i <j < k: If a * </>, a * <y> and a * </c> are all three i?-homeogeneous, then at least one of the three sequences a * </,./>, a * </, A; > and a * (j, k) is iMiomeogeneous.
Proof Let a = <a(0),a(l), ...,a(n-1)> and suppose: «*</>, a*(j) and a*(k) are i?-homeogeneous, and a*(ij} is not iMiomeogeneous.
Then We saw in 1.1 that this so-called pigeonhole principle is intuitionistically false. There is, however, a weak version of the principle which is intuitionistically provable.
4.2 Reasoning with negative statements is an art with its own peculiarities. We mention two of them. Firstly, it occurs, when we are busy proving a negative statement, that we reinforce our assumptions, leaving out some double negation and replacing an assumption '-i ->P' by ' P \ We may do so, as, in intuitionistic logic, ->-iP-*->Q follows from P -> -i Q. In the sequel, we shall indicate such reinforcements by the words ' Suppose even more\ Secondly, we may, again when we are aiming for a negative conclusion, use some statements of the form ' P V -> P ' as an extra assumption. (This is a special case of the first procedure, as -> -> (P V -> P) is an intuitionistic truth). We then may continue the proof by distinction of cases; 'Case (i): Suppose P . . . , Case (ii): Suppose ->P...\ In the sequel, whenever we apply this device, we use the words: 'Distinguish two cases'.
We define, for each subset A of N:
A is weakly infinite := V/? -i --3q[p < q A qeA]. Proof. Suppose a is weakly safe for R. Define A:={qeN\a*<#> is iMiomeogeneous}. Then A is weakly infinite. Observe that our goal is a negative conclusion, and distinguish two cases: In view of a later application, in Lemma 4.9, we rephrase Lemma 4.6.
COROLLARY. For all binary relations R on M,for all aeN*:
IfVg[a*(q) is not weakly safe for R], then a is not weakly safe for R.
Proof. Obvious.
4.8
The difficulty now is that we do not see how to iterate Lemma 4.6 countably many times. (This is done in the classical proof, cf. 3.5). The following conclusion, let us call if (*), is surely out of reach:
(*) For all binary relations R on N:
Assume (•). Given a subset A of f^J we may apply (*) to the binary relation R on N which is defined by: VwVAj[i?(w,n)<r+A(n)]. Thus, (*) is seen to imply:
(**) is refuted by the Brouwerian example mentioned in 1.1. One is tempted to try the following weakening of (*):
For all binary relations R on N:
or its corollary:
In 8.6.2, however, we shall see, by a metamathematical argument, that these conclusions cannot be obtained from the usual axioms of intuitionistic analysis. In view of these impossibilities, we are happy with the following lemma, first established by the second author.
LEMMA. For all binary relations R on N:
Proof. Let R be a binary relation on N such that: Vae^3«[<a(0),<x(l),..., a(« -1)> is not i?-homeogeneous]. We shall use the principle of induction on monotone bars, BI^, (cf. 2.5). We define subsets P and Q of S as follows. For each aeS: P{a) := a is not iMiomeogeneous, and Q(a) := a is not weakly safe for R. Observe that P is a monotone bar in Sf, that P £ Q, and that, according to Corollary 4.7, Q is inductive. Using BI^,, we conclude: g « » , that is: the empty sequence < > is not weakly safe for R. But: < > is weakly safe for R, as Vq[(q} is /Miomeogeneous], and so we have a contradiction.
4.10 Lemma 4.9 says that, for every binary relation RonN, the assumption that the range of every strictly increasing sequence of natural numbers is, in a strong sense, not /Miomeogeneous, leads to a contradiction. In this very weak sense, the classical theorem that there exists an infinite i?-homeogeneous subset of N, is true. In 6.2, we will establish a similar weak version of Ramsey's Theorem itself, that is the theorem that, for every binary relation RonN, there exists an infinite R-homogeneous (see 1.1) subset of N. To obtain this result, we need one further step which we discuss in the next section.
Almost full subsets of N
Containing as many double negations as it does, Lemma 4.4 is not a very
welcome substitute for the classical pigeonhole principle. In this section, we want to approximate the principle by a lemma and a theorem, namely 5.2 and 5.4, which, having a more positive appearance, are less like ghosts from the lost classical paradise.
LEMMA. For all subsets AofN:
IfVyeSrin
Proof. We use AC 0 0 , the axiom of countable choice introduced in 2. Remark: G( a * (y( w o)))' an(^ calculate Wj such that P(a* <y(« 0 ), y(«x)», observe: either P(«*<y(« 0 )» or P(fl*<y(/i x )» or A(y(n 0 )) A 5(y(«i))-Remark: 2(a*<y(« 1 )», and calculate n 2 such that P(a* <y(« 1 ),y(« 2 )))' observe: either P(a*<y(« 1 )» or P(fl*<y(« 2 )» or ^(y(« x )) A 5(y(« 2 )).
We conclude: P(a*<y(« 0 )» V P(a* <y(w 1 )>) V P(a*<y(« 2 )», and: 
The intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem
We start with an application of the Intuitionistic Pigeonhole Principle. 
Proof. Let i? be a binary relation on f^J such that
Applying Lemma 6.1, we find:
Va e £f 3m 3n 3p[m < n A m <p A R(<x(m),0L(ri)) A -> R(oc(m),a(p))].
Therefore V a e y 3«[<a(0), a(l), ...,a(«-1)> is not i?-homeogeneous]. This leads to a contradiction, according to Lemma 4.9. In the proof of this stronger theorem, we apply the so-called finite Ramsey Theorem, which we state here as another lemma. In most classical proofs of the infinite Ramsey Theorem, one does not use the finite Ramsey Theorem. One even goes the other way around, proving the Ramsey Theorem from the infinite one by a so-called compactness argument, (cf. [5, pp. 13-17] ). (In Section 9 we shall reconstruct this compactness argument intuitionistically, using the Fan Theorem.) Ramsey himself however, gave the proof of the infinite theorem only to prepare the reader for the finite theorem, which was the one he needed. We do not give the proof. Ramsey himself, indicating how, given the numbers n, k, the number N may be calculated, already argued constructively.
In the sequel, we frequently follow the set theoretic convention of identifying a natural number n with the set of its predecessors {0,1,...,«-1}. Proof Let R, T be binary relations on N which fulfil the requirements of the lemma. We define a subset P of the set S 1 of strictly increasing finite sequences of natural numbers in the following way. For each a = <a(0),a(l),
.
..,a(n-\)}eS: P(a) := 3/ < n3j < n3k < n[i <j A i < k A R(a(i), a(J)) A T(a(i), a(k))].
Observe that, in consequence of Lemma 6.1, P is a monotone bar in S. We define a proposition QED, as follows:
We also define a subset Q of the set S of strictly increasing finite sequences of natural numbers:
for
each a e S: Q(a) :=VyeSf 3n[P(a * <y(«))> V QED]. Observe that P £ Q. We claim that Q is inductive, that is: VaeS[Vq[S(a*(qy) -> Q(a* <#»] -> Q(a)].
Proof of this claim. Let a = <a(0), a(\),..., a(n -1)> be such that Vq[S(a * <<?» Using Lemma 6.3, the finite Ramsey Theorem, we calculate NeN such that, for each function g from NxN to n there exists ij,k < N such that i <j < k and g(i,j) = g(i,k) = g(j,k).
Now let ye2>. Calculate n 0 := fip[S(a* (y(p)y)]. As Q(a * <y(«o)>).
w e calculate B^N such that P{a*(y(n o ),y{n^) V QED. As Q(a*(y(n 0 )}) and Q{a*(y{n^)>), we calculate, using Theorem 5.4, the Intuitionistic Pigeonhole Principle, n 2 eN, such that both P(a*<j{n^),y{n^)>) V QED and P(a * <y(«i), y{n 2 )}) V QED. As Vz' < 3[Q(a * <y(» i )»], we calculate, using Theorem
5.4, « 3 e fol such that Vi < 3[P(a * (y(n t ), y(« 3 )») V QED].
We continue this procedure for N steps. In the end, we have defined natural numbers n o ,n lt ...,«iv-i s u c n that: Vi < NVj < N[i <./-> (P(a * <y(/i<), y(«,)) V £ED)]. We distinguish two cases.
Case(i): QED.
Case (ii): Vi < NV/ < JV[i <y-» P(tf * <y(«<), y(«,)»]-We define, for each i,j < N such that i<j: a ij :=a*<j{n^,y{n^)'y. We build, in finitely many steps, three functions, /, g, h, from Nx.N to n + 2 such that, for all i j < N such that
i<>: MJ)<g(i,J) and f(i,j) < h(i,j) and R(a iJ (f(i,j)),a i Mi>J))) and
T{a ij {f{i,j)),a ij {h{Uj))).
We distinguish three subcases. Case (ii)a: 3/ < N3y < JV[i <y A g(i,f) = h{i,j)]. Let ij < N be such numbers. Let s•= a u {f{hj)) and t:=a u {g{i,j)). Observe: R ((s,t) ) A 7T(<M», therefore: QJE:D.
Case (ii)b: 3/ < Nlj < N[i <j A (g(i,/) < n v A(i,/) < »)]. Let ij < N be such numbers. We distinguish two cases, namely: Either g{i,j) = n + \ or /i(/,/) = n + 1 . Then: P(a* (y(n } ))). Or g(i,y) < n and / I ( / J ) ^ n. Then: P(a* (yC^))). In both cases:
In view of our choice of N, let i,j, k < N be such that i <j <k and f{i,j)=f(hk)=f{j,k).
Now, let s:=a{f(i,j% r:=7(« { ), w:=H«i) and y:=y( W;t ). Observe: (i?(s, f) v R(s,u)) A (/?(>, r) V R(s,v)) A (R(s,u) V i?(.s,v)).
Spelling this out, we find two sequences from {<s, f>, <5, «>, <s, y>} that belong to i?. In a similar way, we find two sequences from {<j, />, <j, M>, <5, y>} that belong to 7. Combining, we find a sequence from {<s, / > , < J , M>,<5,y>} that belongs to i? n 7 1 .
We conclude: 3p[P(a* (y(p)})] and 0£Z).
Thus in all cases, we have:
This ends the proof of our claim, that Q is inductive.
Using the principle of induction on monotone bars, BI^, (cf. 2.5), we conclude:
THEOREM. (Intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem).
For all binary relations R,T on N: If Vaeyimlnlm < n A R(<x(m),<x(n)] and V(xe^3m3n[m < n A T(<x(m),a(/i»], < « A R(a(m), a(«)) A T(a(m), a(n))].
Let /?, r be binary relations on N which fulfil the requirements of the theorem. Let a e^.
Define binary relations R a ,T a on N by: for all m,neN: RJ^m,n):= R(oc(m),a(«)) and 7;(/w,«) = T(<x(m),a(«)).
Observe that For each txejV and each a = <(0), ...,a(n -\))eN* we may form the finite sequence <xoa:= <a(a(0)),a(a(l)), ...,a(fl(n -1))>. The finite sequence a o a is called the composition of a and a.
Vpetf>lm3n[m < n A RJfi(m),P(n))] and
For each A:eN, 5 t will denote the set of strictly increasing finite sequences of natural numbers of length k (equivalently, with k as domain).
Let keN and let R be a fc-ary relation on N. We define
R is almost full :=^<xe^3ae S k [R(a o a)].
THEOREM (Generalized Ramsey Theorem).
For each keN, k > 0: If R and T are almost full k-ary relations on N, then R 0 T is an almost full k-ary relation on N.
Proof The proof is by induction. The cases k = 1, k -2 have been treated in Theorems 5.4 and 6.5 respectively. Assume that keN and that the theorem has been proved for the cases \,...,k. We sketch the proof for the case k+\. The proof is in three steps. Let R, The almost full (k+ l)-ary relations on N. Without loss of generality, we may assume that both R and T are subsets of S k+1 .
Step one (cf. Observe that R~ and T~ are almost full. Using the induction hypothesis we conclude that R~ 0 T~ is almost full, in particular:
We generalize this result as follows: let y e Sf and define /r-ary relations R~ and Tõ n N by: for all aeN k 
: R^(a) := 3n[R(yo(a* (n)))] and T~{a) := 3n[T(yo(a*<»»)].
Again, R~ and T~, and therefore: R~ n T~ are almost full, in particular:
Step two (cf. Lemma 6.4): Define a subset P of ftJ* by: for all aeN*:
In
Step one, we have seen: P is a monotone bar in £f. We define a proposition QED by: QED:=3aeS k+1 Observe that P £ Q. Arguing very much like we did in the proof of Lemma 6.4, we may establish, applying once more the Finite Ramsey Theorem (Lemma 6.3), that Q is inductive.
Using BI^,, the principle of induction on monotone bars (cf. 2.5), we conclude: ), and therefore: QED, that is:
Step three (cf. Theorem 6.5): Let ye9* and consider the subsets R y and T y of S k+1 denned by: for all a e S k+1 : R y (a) := R(y o a) and 7J(a) := T(y o a).
Observe that R y and 7^ are almost full (k+ l)-ary relations on ftl. Using the result of Step two, we conclude: 3aeS k+1 [R y 
(a) A T y (a)], that is: 3aeS k+1 [R(yoa) A T(yoa)].
Therefore: VyeS/'3aeS k+1 [R{yoa) A T(yoa)], that is: i? n Tis almost full.
.Some remarks on the recursion-theoretic counterexamples
In this section, we examine the construction, due to Jockusch [6] , of a recursive binary relation R on N such that every infinite recursive subset W of N contains numbers m,n such that m <n and R(m,n) and numbers p,q such that p < q and -> R(p, q). (The earlier counterexample to Ramsey's Theorem found by Specker [13] is a bit more involved, as it is based on the existence of two recursively enumerable sets of incomparable degrees of unsolvability.) We shall see that this construction is closely related to the construction of a A°-subset A of N such that every infinite recursive subset W of N is not a subset of A and not a subset of N\A. (A subset A of N with the latter property is sometimes called a bi-immune set.)
We want to explore the intuitionistic meaning of these constructions. Moreover, we shall draw some information from them concerning the formal strength of our axioms. In doing so, we reinforce a remark by the second author, that the double negation of the classical Ramsey Theorem, that is, the statement that, for all binary
is not derivable in any of the usual formalizations of intuitionistic analysis. Classically, one easily forms such sets A,B by going through the sequence V o , V x , V 2 ,..., disregarding the finite sets among them, and choosing from each infinite set two elements which are both different from every element chosen from one of the earlier mentioned sets. One lets A consist of the first members of all pairs thus found, and B of the second members. Intuitionistically, the main difficulty with this procedure is that we cannot decide in general whether a given set is infinite or not. In some special cases, however, this difficulty is absent.
8.2 Recall from 7.1, that, for each neN, S n is the set of all strictly increasing finite sequences of natural numbers of length n. We call a subset X of f^J finite if and only if these exist neN and aeS n such that X = {a(0),a{ 1),...,a(n -1)}.
We also define, for each subset Xof N and each neN # X ^ n (X has at least n elements) := 3ae S n V/ < n[a(j) eX].
Observe that, for each finite subset X of N and each neN, we may decide: (i) There exist recursive binary relations R, T on N such that:
(ii) There exist ^jj'Subsets A,B of N such that:
Proof Let {W n m ) n mGN be the universal double sequence that we mentioned in 8. (id) Let /?eN. The set {xeN \x ^ p} is recursively enumerable and, being so, it occurs in the sequence W Q ,W^W 2 ,.... Calculate neH such that W n = {xeN\x^ p). As in (ic), we are striving for a negative conclusion. Strengthening our assumptions and reasoning as in the proof of (ic), we find meN such that, for all j ^ n, if W i has at least 2y+2 elements, then the first 2y+2 elements of W^ belong to W } m already. Observe that p is the first element of the infinite set W n and also the first element of W nm . Therefore, we may calculate / < 2« + 2 such that p = OL m {i). Observe: Vg m t 8. 6 We may draw some metamathematical conclusions from Theorem 8.5. Let EL be the formal system for intuitionistic analysis which is explained in [14] .
Let CT be Church's thesis in the following form:
(Tis the recursive subset of Therefore: E L + C T + BIM is inconsistent. This is a well-known fact, first shown by Kleene, who in [7] gave an example of a recursive subtree T of the binary tree {0,1}*, which has arbitrarily long finite branches, but is such that we may calculate, for each recursive infinite branch, an initial part that does not belong to T.
Remark that, as EL + CT is consistent, it is impossible to prove the Intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem 6.5 in EL. It follows from [9] that the system EL + BI^ + CT 0 is consistent. Therefore, we are unable to prove, in this system:
CT 0 may be consistently added to much stronger systems for intuitionistic analysis, for instance the system FIM of [8] . In no such system is the above-mentioned statement provable. If
We claim that, in EL + CT 0 + MP one may prove: Define a e^ by: a(0) =/(0) and for all neN: <x(n+ 1) =/(a(/i)).
Ca^e (ii). N\/4 is weakly infinite, is treated in a similar way. This proves the claim.
As EL + CT 0 + MP is consistent, (cf. [10] ), we conclude: We cannot prove in EL that there exist decidable subsets A,BofN with the properties mentioned in Theorem 8.5 (ii). Neither can we do so from any set of axioms to which CT 0 + MP may be added consistently, as, for instance, the system FIM. This application of CP exemplifies a well-known technique in intuitionistic analysis: weak counterexamples may be used, together with CP, to obtain proofs of inconsistency.
9. An application 9.1 We will show how a recent result of Coquand [3] may be derived from the Intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem. We became aware of this result after the other sections of this paper had been completed. We first extend Definition 7.2.
9.2 Let R be a subset of the set S of finite strictly increasing sequences of natural numbers. We define
(We drop the restriction that all sequences in R are of the same length.)
If we consider R in the obvious way as a set of finite sets of natural numbers, then R is almost full if and only if every infinite set of natural numbers has a subset that belongs to R.
An important example of an almost full subset of S is the following:
<> and length (a) > a(0)}.
The letters PH refer to Paris and Harrington [11] .
9.3 Let R be a subset of S. Let ke N and let 8 be a function from S k to {0,1}. We define a subset R 3 of R:
If we consider 3 as a colouring of the A>element-subsets of N, then R s is the set of -monochromatic members of R.
THEOREM (Coquand).
For Let R be an almost full subset of S, and let keN.
Proof. By enumerating S k , we may identify ^ with the set of all functions from S k to {0,1}. Now apply Theorem 9.4 and The Fan Theorem, Theorem 9.5.1.
Observe that Corollary 9.5.2 is an intuitionistic version of the compactness argument, by which in [11] a sharpened version of the Finite Ramsey Theorem is proved. (In order to obtain the desired conclusion, specialize a, in the second line of 9.5.2, to sequences of the form Xm-(m+p)). s is almost full, R f] Tis almost full. In the above argument, it suffices to assume that T is a decidable subset of S. In [3] another constructive version of Ramsey's Theorem, that avoids the application of the intuitionistic principle of bar induction, is stated and proved.
Concluding remarks
10.1 As far as we know, the first person to study Ramsey's Theorem from an intuitionistic point of view was Mervyn Jansen who, in Nijmegen in 1974, wrote a Master's Thesis on the subject, under the guidance of Johan J. de Iongh. He found the example mentioned in 5.3 and, formulating an admittedly unpleasant ad hoc condition, he proved, using the principle of bar induction, that every binary relation R on N which satisfies this condition has the property mentioned in the conclusion of 6.2, that is, it is impossible that both R and its complement are almost full.
The second author, who did not know about the earlier attempt by Jansen, obtained a stronger result, which he announced in the first 'Stelling', added to his dissertation [1] . He proved for every decidable binary relation R on N that not both R and (N x I^J)\i? are almost full. This result sparked off the research which led to the present paper. The first author studied the second author's proof and found Theorems 6.5, 7.3 and 5.4. The negationless wording of these theorems owes something to a question posed by John Burgess. In a letter from 1983, he had asked for a constructive argument establishing < n A a(m) ^ <x(n) AjS(m) ^ £(n)].
(We challenge the reader to find the elementary proof of this special case of Theorem 6.5).
In Section 4 of this paper one finds a paraphrase of the original argument of the second author: Lemma 4.6, Corollary 4.7 and a slight weakening of both Lemma 6.1 and Corollary 6.2 are due to him. Section 8 of this paper elaborates another observation of the second author, to the effect that from consistency results about CT 0 , one may obtain unprovability results concerning versions of Ramsey's Theorem.
The application of the Intuitionistic Ramsey Theorem in Section 9 is due to the first author, who also wrote the final version of the paper.
